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Abstract
In this paper we study the functioning of representative democracy when
politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant
for policy choice. We consider a model with two states of the world. The
distribution of voterspreferred policies shifts with the state. The two can-
didates are both completely o¢ ce-motivated but di¤er in state-dependent
quality. Voters have some information about the state but candidates are
better informed. If votersinformation is unknown to the candidates when
they take positions and su¢ ciently accurate then candidates will, in re-
ned equilibrium, reveal their information by converging to the most likely
median. If votersinformation is not su¢ ciently accurate then there is po-
larization and the candidatesinformation is not revealed to the voters. We
also show that if votersinformation is known to the candidates then they
will never reveal their information to the voters. The candidates will ei-
ther pander by converging on the median that is most likely given only the
voters information or be polarized. With respect to welfare, if voters are
well informed then they all prefer that their information is unknown to the
candidates. However, if voters are not well informed then it is the other way
around, all voters prefer that their information is known by the candidates.
Keywords: Electoral Competition, Uncertainty, Information, Candidate Qual-
ity.
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1 Introduction
It is a reasonable assumption that politicians are generally better informed than
the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. They usually have sta¤
to help them receive and process information and sometimes have access to in-
formation that is not public, for example information related to national security.
Furthermore, they have much stronger incentives than voters to be well informed
because their careers depend on how they do as policy makers. Therefore it is
highly relevant to study the consequences of this informational asymmetry for the
functioning of representative democracy. For example, will politicianspolicy posi-
tions reveal their information to the electorate such that voters can make a better
informed choice in the voting booth? And, if so, will the revealing policy positions
be optimal for the voters?
In this paper we set up and analyze a game theoretic model of electoral compe-
tition where candidates are better informed than voters. We consider an election
with one issue, a continuum of voters, and two candidates who simultaneously an-
nounce credible positions. There are two states of the world and the distribution
of voterspreferred policies shifts with the state. The candidates are purely o¢ ce-
motivated, their only objective is to maximize the probability of winning. Both
candidates and voters receive a signal about the true state, but the candidates
signal is more informative. The candidatessignal is unknown to the voters. With
respect to the signal of the voters we consider both the case where it is unknown
to candidates and the case where candidates observe it. When we assume that the
voterssignal is unknown to the candidates it should not be taken to mean that
candidates do not receive the information of the voters, after all they are voters
themselves. Rather, it should be interpreted as a situation where candidates take
positions relatively early in the campaign where there is considerable uncertainty
about what information voters will have on election day.
The voters do not only care about policy, they also care about candidate quality.
One candidate has a quality advantage in one state and the other candidate has a
quality advantage in the other state, for example because they di¤er in experience
and skills. Furthermore, there is a stochastic element in voters evaluation of
candidates. Suppose, for example, that the two candidates have announced the
same position and that the voters know the true state. Then the high quality
candidate wins with a probability that is greater than one half but smaller than
one. It is the di¤erence in state-dependent quality that creates the central strategic
aspect of the model: The candidate with a quality advantage in the state that is
most likely given the candidatessignal has an incentive to try to reveal the signal
while the candidate with a quality disadvantage has an incentive to try not to
reveal it.
We solve the model for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria satisfying some renement
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criteria. For equilibria where candidates positions reveal their information to
the voters (revealing equilibria) our renement criterion is based on the notion of
unprejudiced beliefs (Bagwell and Ramey (1991)) which was developed precisely
for a signalling game with two senders. For non-revealing equilibria we introduce a
monotonicity condition on votersbeliefs (after showing that the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps (1987)) does not have any bite in this model). Our equilibrium
results are informally summarized in the table below. The two rows represent the
two di¤erent cases we consider (voterssignal unknown or known to candidates).
The two columns represent di¤erent levels of accuracy of the votersinformation.
In the rst row the voterssignal is "quite informative", in the second row it is
"not too informative". These informal characterizations will, of course, be made
precise later on.
Voters signal "quite
informative"
Voters signal "not
too informative"
Case 1: Voters sig-
nal unknown to can-
didates
Revealing Eq. (conver-
gence to most likely me-
dian)
Non-Revealing Eq. (po-
larization)
Case 2: Voterssignal
known to candidates
Non-Revealing Eq. (pan-
dering)
Non-Revealing Eq. (pan-
dering or polarization)
In the rst case, candidates reveal their information if the signal of the voters
is su¢ ciently informative. They do so by converging to the most likely median
(note that, since candidates are better informed than voters, the most likely me-
dian given the candidatessignal is also the most most likely median given both
signals). This is the outcome we would get if the candidates information was
directly observable to the voters. If votersinformation is not su¢ ciently informa-
tive then candidates will be polarized, more precisely each candidate will always
announce the median position of the state in which he has a quality advantage.
Thus the voters cannot infer the candidates information. The intuition behind
the results is as follows. Each candidate can either "tell the truth" by announcing
the median of the most likely state or "lie" by announcing the median of the other
state (here we disregard all other positions, in our analysis we of course consider all
positions). The candidate who has a quality advantage in the most likely state has
no incentive to lie, so he will always tell the truth. The disadvantaged candidate
clearly has an incentive to lie. On the other hand, voters have some information of
their own. Thus, even though they cannot infer what the candidatesinformation
is if the disadvantaged candidate lies, they are more likely to believe the advan-
taged candidate. And then he will have both a quality and a policy advantage. So
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clearly there is a trade-o¤ for the disadvantaged candidate. When the voterssig-
nal is more informative then it is relatively more expensive for the disadvantaged
candidate to lie. This is why we get revelation when votersinformation is "quite
informative" and non-revelation when it is "not too informative".
In the second case, the candidatesinformation is never revealed to the voters
in (rened) equilibrium. There always exists an equilibrium where both candidates
announce the median that is most likely given only the voterssignal. This is what
we call pandering. When the voterssignal is not too accurate then polarization is
also possible. The reason why revelation is not possible in this case is the following.
Suppose both candidates tell the truth in equilibrium, i.e., announce the most likely
median. When candidates know votersinformation then their expectation about
votersbelief if they deviate does not depend on their own information. Therefore
the expected belief of the voters if the disadvantaged candidate lies is the same for
both values of the candidatessignal. This belief must, of course, put a probability
greater than or equal to one half on one of the states. And then it follows that
when the candidate with a quality advantage in this state is disadvantaged given
the candidatessignal, then he will lie. Because if he tells the truth his probability
of winning will be less than one half, if he lies it will be at least one half. So we
cannot have a revealing equilibrium in this case.
Following the equilibrium analysis of the two cases we compare them with
respect to the welfare of the voters, more precisely with respect to each voters
ex ante expected utility. We show that when votersinformation is quite accurate
then all voters are better o¤ in Case 1, i.e., when candidates do not observe the
signal of the voters before taking positions. When the information of the voters is
not too accurate then it is the other way around, all voters are better o¤ in Case 2.
This result follows from the equilibrium analysis and the following Pareto ranking
of strategy proles: Revelation (convergence to the most likely median) dominates
pandering which dominates polarization. This ranking of strategy proles is quite
intuitive. When the candidates converge on the most likely median voters can
infer candidates information and the candidates positions are optimal to the
voters (from an ex ante perspective). When candidates pander voters cannot infer
the information of the candidates but the candidateschoice of positions are at
least responsive to the signal of the voters. In the polarization prole voters again
cannot infer candidatesinformation and the candidatespositions does not reect
any of the information in the game.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briey review some related
literature. Then, in Section 3, we set up the model. Section 4 and 5 contain our
equilibrium results for the two cases and in Section 6 we compare the cases with
respect to welfare. Finally, we discuss and conclude in Section 7.
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2 Related Literature
Two immediately related papers are Schultz (1996) and Martinelli (2001). They
ask the same general question as we do but they make di¤erent assumptions. In
Schultz (1996) candidates are policy-motivated and fully informed about the state
of the world. Voters are uninformed. Thus voters only receive information from
the candidatescredible positions. There is revelation in (rened) equilibrium if at
least one of the candidates has policy preferences that are su¢ ciently similar to the
preferences of the median voter. In any revealing equilibrium there is convergence
to the median policy of the true state of the world.
Martinelli (2001) considers a model where both candidates and voters receive
private information about the state of the world but candidates are better informed
than voters. The main result is that a revealing equilibrium always exists. If
candidates are completely policy-motivated then they do not converge in revealing
equilibria. But if o¢ ce-motivation is su¢ ciently strong then there is convergence.
Several other papers study models in which politicians are better informed
than the electorate. In both Alesina and Cukierman (1990) and Harrington (1993)
policy is decided after the election and voters are uncertain about the candidates
policy preferences. Therefore, earlier policy decisions by the incumbent reveal
information to the voters about what he will do if reelected. That induces the
incumbent (who wants to be reelected) to distort his policy choice. In Alesina and
Cukierman he does so by choosing a noisy policy instrument, in Harrington it is
done by choosing a policy that is more likely to be well received.
Roemer (1994) considers a model where two policy motivated candidates (par-
ties) are better informed about how the economy works than the electorate. Can-
didates announce both policies and theories of the economy, voters update their
beliefs based only on announced theories. In equilibrium there is convergence to
the median with respect to policy but divergence with respect to theory.
In Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) the incumbent is better informed than vot-
ers about how di¤erent policies map into outcomes. Voters update beliefs based on
the incumbents (credible) policy announcement and votes for reelection if his an-
nouncement is preferred to the expected policy of the challenger. The main insight
is that relatively extreme right wing policies are more likely to be implemented by
a left wing incumbent (and vice versa) because of credibility issues.
Our model is also related to the literature on candidate quality/valence. Among
the contributions to this literature are Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose
(2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005). These papers all analyze models
of electoral competition where candidates di¤er in quality such that if they an-
nounce su¢ ciently similar policy positions then each voter votes for the candidate
of highest quality. There is no uncertainty about who the high quality candidate
is. This is fundamentally di¤erent from our model where no candidate has an ex
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ante quality advantage because quality is state-dependent.
Krasa and Polborn (2009a, 2009b) analyze models of electoral competition
where candidatesabilities are policy dependent (see also Schoeld (2003) for a
model with an additive, policy dependent valence term). For example, some can-
didates may be better at running a small government while other candidates are
better at running a big government. When candidates have di¤erent abilities it is
shown that, even though candidates are completely o¢ ce motivated, there will be
policy divergence in equilibrium because candidates play to their own strengths.
The idea of policy dependent candidate abilities is obviously related to the idea
of state-dependent candidate quality that we present in this paper. However, the
ideas are also clearly distinct. In our model votersevaluation of candidateschar-
acteristics does not directly depend on their policy positions. If, for example,
voters know the true state and candidatespositions are close then the choice of
the voters does not depend on where the candidatespositions are in the policy
space.
3 The Model
We consider a one issue election. The policy space X is some closed interval
(bounded or unbounded) on the real axis. There are two purely o¢ ce-motivated
candidates, i.e., their only objective is to maximize the probability of winning. The
candidates simultaneously announce credible policy positions before the election.
The electorate consists of a continuum of voters (indexed by i). The voters
have utility functions over the policy space. The utility functions depend on the
state of the world ! which can be either L or H. The utility function of voter i is
ui(xj!) =  jx  xi (!)j;
where xi (!) is the preferred policy of voter i in state !. The preferred policies of
the voters in state L are distributed according to some distribution function FL
with unique median xmL . We assume that, for each voter i,
xi (H) = x

i (L) +D;
where D > 0. Thus the distribution of preferred policies in state H is given by FH
dened by
FH(x) = FL(x D):
Obviously, the median in state H is xmH = x

mL
+D:
Besides policy, voters also care about candidate quality which is state-dependent.
One candidate, Candidate L, has a quality advantage in the L state while the other
candidate, Candidate H, has a quality advantage (of equal size) in the H state.
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On top of this there is a symmetric stochastic element to each voters candidate
preference. These two features are modelled the following way. Suppose Candidate
L has announced the policy xL and that Candidate H has announced xH . Then
voter is utility of voting for Candidate L is
Ui((L; x
L)j!) =

ui(x
LjL) +  +  if ! = L
ui(x
LjH) +  if ! = H

;
where  > 0 is a parameter and, for some parameter  > 0,  is drawn from the
uniform distribution on the interval [  1
2
; 1
2
]. Note that the realized value of  is
the same for all voters, independent of the state of the world, and unknown to the
candidates when they announce positions. Voter is utility of voting for Candidate
H is
Ui((H; x
H)j!) =

ui(x
H jL) if ! = L
ui(x
H jH) +  if ! = H

:
Each voter votes for the candidate providing the highest expected utility. So if
voter i believes that the probability of state L is L then he votes for Candidate
L if and only if
L(ui(x
LjL)++)+(1 L)(ui(xLjH)+) > Lui(xH jL)+(1 L)(ui(xH jH)+):
This is equivalent to
 > L(ui(x
H jL)  ui(xLjL)  ) + (1  L)(ui(xH jH)  ui(xLjH) + ):
If we plug in the policy utility function of the voter then this inequality becomes
 > L(jxL   xi (L)j   jxH   xi (L)j   )
+ (1  L)(jxL   xi (H)j   jxH   xi (H)j+ ): (1)
Both candidates and voters receive signals that are correlated with the state of
the world. The two candidates both receive the signal !C 2 fl; hg and the voters
all receive the signal !V 2 fl; hg. The signals are distributed according to
Pr(!C = ljL) = Pr(!C = hjH) = C
and
Pr(!V = ljL) = Pr(!V = hjH) = V ;
where 1
2
< V < C  1. Thus the candidatessignal is more informative than the
signal of the voters. We also assume that the signals are independent conditional
on the state of the world. So we have, for example,
Pr(!C = l; !V = ljL) = Pr(!C = ljL)  Pr(!V = ljL) = CV :
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The assumption about conditional independence implies that the candidatessig-
nal only gives them information about the voters signal because it gives them
information about the state of the world.
Both candidates and voters have the prior Pr(L) = Pr(H) = 1
2
. So if candidates
and voters use only their own signal to update their beliefs about the state of the
world then candidatesbeliefs are given by
Pr(Lj!C = l) = Pr(Hj!C = h) = C
and votersbeliefs are given by
Pr(Lj!V = l) = Pr(Hj!V = h) = V :
If updating is based on both signals then beliefs are given by
Pr(Lj!C = l; !V = l) = Pr(Hj!C = h; !V = h) = 
CV
CV + (1  C)(1  V )
and
Pr(Lj!C = l; !V = h) = Pr(Hj!C = h; !V = l) = 
C(1  V )
C(1  V ) + (1  C)V :
We assume that the signal of the candidates is unknown to the voters. With
respect to the voters signal we consider both the case where it is unknown to
candidates and the case where candidates observe it. When we assume that the
voterssignal is unknown to the candidates it should not be taken to mean that
candidates do not receive the information that voters do. Because candidates
are, of course, also voters. Instead it should be interpreted as a situation where
candidates have to announce policy positions relatively early in the campaign and
that they do not know what information voters will receive between then and
election day.
Throughout the paper we assume that
 +D <
1
2
:
This condition implies that if the distance between the candidates positions is at
most D then, no matter what voters believe about the state, each candidate has
a strictly positive probability of winning the election. It simplies our analysis
considerably because it ensures that, in all situations we need to consider, the
realization of  matters. Alternatively we could have assumed that  is drawn from
some distribution with full support on R, for example the normal distribution. But
8
this would only complicate the analysis of the model without adding substantial
insight.
We complete this section by presenting the timelines of the two di¤erent election
games we consider. When the signal of the voters is unknown to the candidates
the timeline is as follows:
1. The candidates receive the signal !C and then simultaneously announce pol-
icy positions.
2. The voters observe the candidatespositions and receive the signal !V . The
value of  is realized. The voters cast their votes.
3. The winning candidate enacts his announced position.
When the signal of the voters is known to the candidates the timeline is:
1. The candidates receive the signal !C and candidates and voters receive the
signal !V . The candidates simultaneously announce policy positions.
2. The value of  is realized. The voters cast their votes.
3. The winning candidate enacts his announced position.
The rst situation we refer to as Case 1, the second situation we refer to as Case
2.
4 Analysis of Case 1
4.1 Equilibrium
A strategy prole for the candidates consists of a pair of policy positions for each
candidate, one position for each value of the candidatessignal. Thus it can be
written
(xL(l); xL(h)); (xH(l); xH(h));
where xi(!C) is the position of Candidate i when the value of the signal is !C .
The belief functions of the voters depend on the candidates positions and
the voterssignal. We make the assumption that all voters have the same belief
function. The votersbelief about the probability of state L is written
L(x
L; xH ; !V ):
Each candidates objective is to maximize the probability of winning for each
value of !C given the other candidates strategy, the belief function of the voters,
the distribution of the voterssignal and the distribution of . The following lemma
shows that the median voter decides the outcome of the election.
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Lemma 4.1 (The Median Voter Decides the Outcome) Suppose that, given
the candidatespositions, the voters signal, and the realization of , the median
voter strictly prefers Candidate L (H). Then a strict majority of voters strictly
prefers Candidate L (H).
Proof. Let xL and xH be the positions of the candidates. Suppose the median
voter strictly prefers Candidate L, i.e.,
 > L(jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j   ) + (1  L)(jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j+ ):
We then have to show that, for each voter i in a strict majority,
 > L(jxL xi (L)j jxH xi (L)j )+(1 L)(jxL xi (H)j jxH xi (H)j+):
Suppose xL  xH (the other case is analogous). It then su¢ ces to show that
the inequality above holds for all voters i with xi (L)  xmL (this is only a weak
majority but by a simple continuity argument the inequality also holds for voters
with a preferred point slightly to the right of the median).
Pick a voter i with xi (L)  xmL . The inequality is satised if
jxL   xi (L)j   jxH   xi (L)j  jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j
and
jxL   xi (H)j   jxH   xi (H)j  jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j.
These inequalities are straightforward to verify.
The proof of the statement when the median voter strictly prefers Candidate
H is analogous.2
By the lemma and inequality (1) it follows that if (xH(l); xH(h)) is the strat-
egy of Candidate H then the problem of Candidate L when the candidates have
received the signal !C is
max
x
Pr
(!V j!C);
[ > L(x; x
H(!C); !V )((jx  xmL j   jxH(!C)  xmL j   )+
(1  L(x; xH(!C); !V ))(jx  xmH j   jxH(!C)  xmH j+ )]:
Similarly, if (xL(l); xL(h)) is the strategy of Candidate L then the problem of
Candidate H when the candidates have received the signal !C is
max
x
Pr
(!V j!C);
[ < L(x
L(!C); x; !V )((jxL(!C)  xmL j   jx  xmL j   )+
(1  L(xL(!C); x; !V ))(jxL(!C)  xmH j   jx  xmH j+ )]:
Then we are ready to dene our notion of equilibrium. It is that of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium with the extra condition that all voters have the same belief
function.
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Denition 4.2 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of candidate strategies,
(x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h));
and a voter belief function about the probability of state L,
^L(x
L; xH ; !V );
such that the following two conditions hold.
1. For each value of the candidatessignal, each candidates position maximizes
his probability of winning given the other candidates position, the belief func-
tion of the voters, the distribution of the voterssignal, and the distribution
of .
2. The belief function is consistent with Bayes rule on the equilibrium path.
I.e., if x^L(l) 6= x^L(h) or x^H(l) 6= x^H(h) then, for all !C, !V ,
L(x^
L(!C); x^H(!C); !V ) = Pr(Lj!C ; !V ):
And if x^L(l) = x^L(h) = x^L and x^H(l) = x^H(h) = x^H then, for all !V ,
L(x^
L; x^H ; !V ) = Pr(Lj!V ):
An equilibrium where the positions of the candidates reveal their information
to the voters, i.e., at least one of the candidates announces di¤erent positions for
di¤erent values of their signal, is called a revealing equilibrium. An equilibrium
where each candidate announces the same position for both values of their signal
is called a non-revealing equilibrium.
4.2 Revealing Equilibria
We will rst introduce a renement condition that puts restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in revealing equilibria. Essentially we use the concept of un-
prejudiced beliefs introduced by Bagwell and Ramey (1991). This concept has
previously been used in a model of electoral competition by Schultz (1996).
The idea behind the concept of unprejudiced beliefs is the following: Suppose
(x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h)) are the candidate strategies in some revealing equi-
librium and that voters observe some disequilibrium-pair (xL; xH). Then voters
consider, for each value of !C , whether it takes only one or both candidates to
deviate in order to generate (xL; xH). If this is di¤erent for the two values of !C
then voters will assume that the true value is the one requiring only one deviation
to generate (xL; xH). For example, if the disequilibrium-pair satises xL = x^L(l),
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xL 6= x^L(h), and xH 6= x^H(h) then voters will assume that !C = l. When voters
have formed their belief about !C they simply use Bayesian updating on this and
their own signal to form their belief about the state of the world. In the model
of Bagwell and Remy (and the model of Schultz) senders are fully informed and
the receiver has no private information. So the Bayesian updating part is our
(straightforward) addition to the concept of unprejudiced beliefs.
The precise denition of unprejudiced equilibria, i.e., equilibria with unpreju-
diced beliefs, is given below. It basically says that if one candidates equilibrium
strategy is revealing and the other candidate deviates to an out-of-equilibrium
position then voters will believe the non-deviating candidate. This is a slightly
di¤erent but equivalent formulation of the idea described above.
Denition 4.3 (Unprejudiced Revealing Equilibrium) Consider a revealing
equilibrium (x^L(l); x^L(h)), (x^H(l); x^H(h)), ^L. It is unprejudiced if the following
two conditions are satised.
1. Suppose x^L(l) 6= x^L(h). Then, for all x 6= x^H(l); x^H(h) and !V ,
^L(x^
L(l); x; !V ) = ^L(x^
L(l); x^H(l); !V ) and
^L(x^
L(h); x; !V ) = ^L(x^
L(h); x^H(h); !V ):
2. Suppose x^H(l) 6= x^H(h). Then, for all x 6= x^L(l); x^L(h) and !V ,
^L(x; x^
H(l); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(l); x^H(l); !V ) and
^L(x; x^
H(h); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(h); x^H(h); !V ):
Our rst result shows that in any unprejudiced revealing equilibrium the can-
didates converge on the median position of the state they believe to be most likely,
i.e., xmL if !
C = l and xmH if !
C = h.
Theorem 4.4 (Unprejudiced Revealing Equilibria: Strategies) In any un-
prejudiced revealing equilibrium the candidate strategies are
(x^L(l); x^L(h)) = (x^H(l); x^H(h)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
Proof. Let (x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h)) be the candidate strategies in an un-
prejudiced revealing equilibrium. At least one of the candidates must announce
di¤erent policies in the two states. Suppose x^L(l) 6= x^L(h) (the case x^H(l) 6= x^H(h)
is analogous). Assume that x^H(l) 6= xmL and consider an !C = l deviation by Can-
didate H to a position x 6= x^H(h) with
0  x  xmL < jx^H(l)  xmL j
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(if x^H(h) 6= xmL simply let x = xmL). This deviation will increase the median
voters utility of voting for Candidate H at least as much in state L as it will
decrease it in state H. And since the votersbeliefs are still given by Bayesian
updating based on both signals it follows that candidate Hs probability of win-
ning is higher after the deviation, which is a contradiction. Therefore we must
have x^H(l) = xmL . Similarly we get x^
H(h) = xmH . And then we can use the same
argument for Candidate L to get x^L(l) = xmL and x^
L(h) = xmH . 2
Our next step is to nd the set of parameter values for which an unprejudiced
revealing equilibrium exists. The following result shows that we have existence if
and only if the voterssignal is su¢ ciently informative. The proof is in Appendix
A.
Theorem 4.5 (Unprejudiced Revealing Equilibria: Existence) There exists
an unprejudiced revealing equilibrium if and only if
V  R;
where
R =
1
2
(1 +

 +D
):
The reasoning behind the result is as follows. Because beliefs are unprejudiced
we only have to consider deviations to the least likely median, i.e., to xmH when
!C = l and to xmL when !
C = h. So, loosely speaking, we have an equilibrium
if neither candidate can protably "lie" to the electorate. It is easy to dene
the belief function such that it is never protable for the advantaged candidate
(Candidate L when !C = l, Candidate H when !C = h) to lie. So we have an
equilibrium if and only if we can dene a belief function such that, for each value
of !C , it is not protable for the disadvantaged candidate to lie by announcing
the least likely median. This can only be done for su¢ ciently high values of V
because lying is relatively more costly the more informative the voterssignal is.
It is worth noting that the cut-o¤ value R does not depend on 
C , i.e., the
accuracy of the candidates information has no inuence on how accurate voters
information has to be in order to make candidates reveal their information1. While
a higher C makes the disadvantaged candidate worse o¤ in equilibrium it also
makes it less attractive to lie because it makes the probability of "being caught"
higher (a higher C makes it more likely that !V = !C from the viewpoint of the
candidates). And it turns out that these two e¤ects cancel out.
1Note, however, that since we assume C > V we must have C > R for an unprejudiced
revealing equilibrium to exist.
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R is obviously increasing in . So if the di¤erence-in-quality parameter 
increases then the electorate has to be better informed in order to make the can-
didates reveal their information. For higher  it is relatively more costly (in terms
of probability of winning) for the disadvantaged candidate to reveal the state. So
when  increases the new cut-o¤ value of V must make it more costly for the
disadvantaged candidate not to reveal, i.e., it must be higher. We also see that
when the di¤erence in candidate quality vanishes then there exists a revealing
equilibrium no matter how little information the electorate has (lim!0 

R =
1
2
).
Also note that R is decreasing in D, the distance between the medians of the
two states. So when the median positions of the two states are further apart then
a revealing equilibrium exist for less informed electorates. The reason is that a
higher D makes it relatively more costly to lie for the disadvantaged candidate.
The good news from this observation is that when the state of the world really
matters for policy choice (i.e., D is high) then it takes less voter information to
make the candidates reveal their information by converging to the most likely
median.
4.3 Non-Revealing Equilibria
In non-revealing equilibria each candidate announces the same position for both
values of !C . Thus the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium can simply
be written
(x^L; x^H);
where x^i is the position of candidate i. We rst consider equilibria with no re-
strictions on votersout-of-equilibrium beliefs. We limit our attention to equilibria
where the position of each candidate is between the medians of the two states
of the world. This is justied by the following observation: Suppose (x^L; x^H) =2
[xmL ; x

mH
]2 is the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium. Then so is the
strategy prole where, for each i, x^i is replaced by xmL if x^
i < xmL and by x

mH
if
xmH < x^
i. Thus we have that if there exists a non-revealing equilibrium where at
least one candidate is not positioned between the two medians then there exists a
"corresponding" equilibrium with strategy prole in [xmL ; x

mH
]2. The observation
is proved in Appendix A.
In the following theorem we nd all non-revealing equilibria where the position
of each candidate is between the medians of the two states of the world. The proof
is in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.6 (Non-Revealing Equilibria: Strategies and Existence)
Let (x^L; x^H) 2 [xmL ; xmH ]2. Then the following statements hold.
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1. If maxfx^L   xmL ; xmH   x^Hg <  then (x^L; x^H) is the strategy prole of a
non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
V  1
2
(1 +
s
  maxfx^L   xmL ; xmH   x^Hg
( + (x^H   x^L))(2C   1) ):
2. If maxfx^L   xmL ; xmH   x^Hg   then (x^L; x^H) is the strategy prole of a
non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
x^L   x^H = :
Briey described, the arguments of the proof are as follows. If maxfx^L  
xmL ; x

mH
  x^Hg <  then any deviation x by candidate L (H) gives the lowest
probability of winning when ^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 (^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1) for both values
of !V . Therefore (x^L; x^H) are equilibrium strategies precisely if candidate L cannot
protably deviate to xmH when !
C = h and ^L(x

mH
; x^H ; !V ) = 0 and candidate
H cannot protably deviate to xmL when !
C = l and ^L(x^
L; xmL ; !
V ) = 1. These
conditions lead directly to the cut-o¤ value for V . When maxfx^L   xmL ; xmH  
x^Hg   there is at least one candidate who can always win with a probability
equal or arbitrarily close to 1
2
by deviating (no matter how we specify out-of-
equilibrium beliefs). Thus it must be the case that this candidate always wins with
a probability of at least 1
2
in equilibrium. This is only possible if x^L   x^H = .
An immediate consequence of the theorem is that a non-revealing equilibrium
with candidate positions in [xmL ; x

mH
] always exists. If D <  then it follows from
the rst statement that there exists an equilibrium with x^L = xmH and x^
H = xmL
for all C ; V . If   D then it follows from the second statement that, for all
values of C and V , there exists an equilibrium with x^L   x^H = .
The abundance of non-revealing equilibria makes it natural to ask if some of
them can be eliminated by a suitable renement condition. In signalling games
the most commonly used renement condition is the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and
Kreps (1987)). In games where there are only two sender-types (t1 and t2) the
content of the criterion is that if a deviation from equilibrium could be protable
only for ti then, upon observing this deviation, receivers should believe with cer-
tainty that the sender is of this type. In order to make the Intutive Criterion t
our set-up we need to make some minor adjustments. We say that a non-revealing
equilibrium in our model satises the Intuitive Criterion if the following restrictions
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs hold. Consider a non-revealing equilibrium (x^L; x^H),
^L and a deviation by Candidate L to some x. Suppose that we can make the de-
viation protable (by changing the out-of-equilibrium beliefs) if and only if !C = l
15
(!C = h). Then we must have
^L(x; x^
H ; l)  Pr(Lj!C = l; !V = l); ^L(x; x^H ; h)  Pr(Lj!C = l; !V = h)
(^L(x; x^
H ; l)  Pr(Lj!C = h; !V = l); ^L(x; x^H ; h)  Pr(Lj!C = h; !V = h)):
This means that voters should believe that state L (H) is at least as likely as it
would be if they learned that !C = l (!C = h) and then did Bayesian updating
based on this and their own signal. In other words, we do not allow voters to
believe that !C = h (!C = l) is possible at all. Analogous restrictions should hold
in out-of-equilibrium situations where Candidate H deviates.
It turns out that (our version of) the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate
any of the non-revealing equilibria from Theorem 4.6. The argument is rather
straightforward. Consider a deviation by candidate L to some position x (the
argument for deviations by candidate H is completely analogous). The maximum
probability of winning that candidate L can achieve by this deviation when we
allow out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be changed is independent of the value of !C
(because we get the maximum probability of winning by letting L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0
or L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 1 for both values of !V and thus the conditional distribution of
!V given !C does not matter). In all equilbria candidate L wins with probability
p  1
2
when !C = l and probability 1 p when !C = h. So if x could be a protable
deviation when !C = l then the same is true when !C = h. Thus the equilibrium
belief function does not violate the Intuitive Criterion if, for all x 6= x^L,
^L(x; x^
H ; l)  Pr(Lj!C = h; !V = l); ^L(x; x^H ; h)  Pr(Lj!C = h; !V = h):
All equilibrium strategies considered in the rst statement of the theorem are
supported by belief functions satisfying these conditions (we have ^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) =
0 for all x 6= x^L and both values of !V ). This is not true for the equilibrium
strategies considered in the second part of the theorem. But in this case each
candidate wins with probability 1
2
in equilibrium for both values of !C and thus
the Intuitive Criterion does not put any restrictions at all on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs.
One way of eliminating many of the non-revealing equilibria is to impose a
monotonicity condition on the voter belief function. The content of our condition
is the following. If one candidate moves to a position that is at least as close to
xmL (x

mH
) and not closer to xmH (x

mL
) then L (1  L) does not decrease. For
example, if xmL  x < y  xmH then a move from y to x by one of the candidates
will not make voters believe that state L is less likely.
Denition 4.7 (Monotone Belief Function) A voter belief function L is said
to be monotone if the following condition holds. Suppose that, for some x; y 2 X,
jx  xmL j  jy   xmL j and jx  xmH j  jy   xmH j:
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Then, for all z 2 X, !V 2 fl; hg,
L(x; z; !
V )  L(y; z; !V ) and L(z; x; !V )  L(z; y; !V ):
There are no directly state-dependent costs for the candidates that can justify
this condition. Nevertheless, it does seem appealing for voters to think that if one
candidate moves closer to, e.g., xmL and not closer to x

mH
then it is not less likely
that !C = l and thus state L is not less likely to be the true state.
It is worth noting that restricting attention to monotone equilibria (i.e., equi-
libria with monotone belief functions) does not change our result on existence
of unprejudiced revealing equilibria. More precisely, the conclusion from Theo-
rem 4.5 still holds if we require revealing equilibria to be both unprejudiced and
monotone. This follows easily by verifying that the equilibrium belief function
used in the proof is monotone.
In the following result we nd the candidate positions that are possible in
monotone non-revealing equilibria.
Theorem 4.8 (Monotone Non-Revealing Equilibria: Strategies) The can-
didate positions in any monotone non-revealing equilibrium must satisfy
x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H :
Proof. Suppose x^L > xmL . Consider a deviation by Candidate L to
x =

xmL if x^
L   xmH  D
xmH   (x^L   xmH ) if x^L   xmH > D

:
This deviation will increase the median voters utility of voting for Candidate L
at least as much in state L as it will decrease it in state H. Furthermore, the
deviation will, by monotonicity of the belief function, not make voters believe that
state L is less likely. Therefore it is easy to see that the deviation is protable
when !C = l. Thus we must have x^L  xmL and by symmetry it follows that
xmH  x^H .2
When the monotonicity condition is imposed on non-revealing equilibria we get
that such equilibria exist if and only if the accuracy of the voterssignal is below
some cut-o¤ value. From the rst statement in Theorem 4.6 we already know the
cut-o¤ value for monotone non-revealing equilibria with x^L = xmL and x^
H = xmH
(the belief function used in the proof satises the monotonicity condition for these
positions). Furthermore, we can show that if some pair of positions is the strategy
prole of a monotone non-revealing equilibrium then so is (xmL ; x

mH
). Suppose
(x^L; x^H) is the strategy prole of a monotone non-revealing equilibrium. Since
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x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H it is easy to see that the strategy prole can be supported
by a monotone belief function ^L satisfying Bayesrule on the equilibrium path
and
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= x^L; !V = l; h:
And then it is straightforward to check that (xmL ; x

mH
) can be supported by a
monotone belief function ~L satisfying Bayesrule on the equilibrium path and
~L(x

mL
; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= xmH ; !V = l; h;
~L(x; x

mH
; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= xmL ; !V = l; h:
Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.9 (Monotone Non-Revealing Equilibria: Existence) There ex-
ists a monotone non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
V  N ;
where
N =
1
2
(1 +
r

( +D)(2C   1)):
For any V  N there exists a monotone non-revealing equilibrium with
x^L = xmL and x^
H = xmH :
From Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.9 it follows that, for all parameter values,
either an unprejudiced revealing equilibrium or a monotone non-revealing equilib-
rium exists. We also see that for some parameter values both types of equilibria
exist.
Corollary 4.10 (Existence of Rened Equilibria) We have that
R =
1
2
(1 +

 +D
) <
1
2
(1 +
r

( +D)(2C   1)) = 

N :
So for all parameter values there exists either an unprejudiced revealing equilibrium
or a monotone non-revealing equilibrium. When C > R both types of equilibria
exist for all V s in an interval of non-zero length.
The following gure sums up our results on existence of rened revealing and
non-revealing equilibria.
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5 Analysis of Case 2
5.1 Equilibrium
In this case a strategy prole for the candidates consists of four policy positions
for each candidate, one position for each possible combination of the candidates
signal and the voterssignal. We let xi(!C ; !V ) denote the position of Candidate
i when the candidatessignal is !C and the voterssignal is !V .
As in the previous case the voters observe the position of each candidate and
the value of their own signal, so their belief function about the probability of state
L can again be written
L(x
L; xH ; !V ):
We again assume that all voters share the same belief function and thus the result
that the median voter decides the outcome of the election (Lemma 4.1) is also
valid here.
Our notion of equilibrium is completely analogous to the one used in the previ-
ous case. An equilibrium consists of a strategy prole and a voter belief function.
The strategy of each candidate maximizes his probability of winning given the
other candidates strategy, the belief function of the voters, and all available infor-
mation. On the equilibrium path the belief function is consistent with Bayes rule.
The only thing that is di¤erent from the previous case is that the candidates now
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know the value of the voterssignal so they do not have to rely on the distribution
of !V given their own signal.
We divide equilibria into three types. An equilibrium is said to be fully revealing
if, for each value of !V , there is at least one candidate who reveals the value of !C .
I.e., for each !V there exists at least one i such that the strategy of Candidate i
satises
x^i(l; !V ) 6= x^i(h; !V ):
An equilibrium is said to be partially revealing if at least one candidate reveals the
value of !C for one value of !V while neither candidate reveals !C for the other
value of !V . For example, we could have
x^i(l; l) 6= x^i(h; l) for at least one i
and
x^i(l; h) = x^i(h; h) for both i.
In such an equilibrium voters infer the true value of !C when !V = l but they do
not when !V = h. The nal type of equilibria are non-revealing equilibria where
the candidates never reveal the true value of !C , i.e., their strategies satisfy
x^i(l; !V ) = x^i(h; !V ) for both i and both values of !V .
5.2 Fully and Partially Revealing Equilibria
We will again restrict attention to equilibria with belief functions that are unprej-
udiced. Thus we assume that if one candidates equilibrium strategy reveals the
value of !C for some !V then an out-of equilibrium deviation by the other candi-
date does not change votersbelief. We can formulate the condition as follows.
1. Suppose x^L(l; !V ) 6= x^L(h; !V ) for some !V . Then, for all x 6= x^H(l; !V ); x^H(h; !V ),
^L(x^
L(l; !V ); x; !V ) = ^L(x^
L(l; !V ); x^H(l; !V ); !V ) and
^L(x^
L(h; !V ); x; !V ) = ^L(x^
L(h; !V ); x^H(h; !V ); !V ):
2. Suppose x^H(l; !V ) 6= x^H(h; !V ) for some !V . Then, for all x 6= x^L(l; !V ); x^L(h; !V ),
^L(x; x^
H(l; !V ); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(l; !V ); x^H(l; !V ); !V ) and
^L(x; x^
H(h; !V ); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(h; !V ); x^H(h; !V ); !V ):
As in the previous case it is fairly straightforward to show that if the value of
!C is revealed to the voters in equilibrium then each candidates position must be
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the most likely median (see Theorem 4.4). So if x^i(l; !V ) 6= x^i(h; !V ) for at least
one i then we must have
x^L(l; !V ) = x^H(l; !V ) = xmL and x^
L(h; !V ) = x^H(h; !V ) = xmH :
Thus, in any unprejudiced fully revealing equilibrium the candidates always con-
verge on the most likely median.
It turns out that when the voter belief function is required to be unprejudiced
then neither fully nor partially revealing equilibria exist. Suppose we have an equi-
librium which is revealing for !V = l. Then, for this value of !V , both candidates
must be at xmL if !
C = l and at xmH if !
C = h. Two necessary conditions for
equilibrium are that candidate H cannot protably deviate to xmH when !
C = l
and that candidate L cannot protably deviate to xmL when !
C = h. It is easy
to see that the rst condition implies ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) >
1
2
and that the second
condition implies ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) <
1
2
, which is a contradiction. So we conclude
that when voters information is known to the candidates and their belief func-
tion is required to be unprejudiced then it is never possible for voters to infer the
candidatesinformation from their positions.
5.3 Non-Revealing Equilibria
In non-revealing equilibria the candidatespositions do not depend on the value
of !C , only (possibly) on !V . Therefore an equilibrium strategy prole can be
written
(x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h));
where, for example, x^L(l) is the position of candidate L when !V = l. Note the
di¤erence from Case 1 where x^L(l) denoted the equilibrium position of Candidate
L when !C = l.
Analogously to Case 1 we can nd all non-revealing equilibria where positions
are between the two medians (restricting attention to such equilibria is justied
by the same argument as in Case 1, see p. 14). Since we are primarily interested
in non-revealing equilibria with monotone belief functions we defer the result to
Appendix B.
The denition of monotone belief functions is exactly as in Case 1 (see Den-
ition 4.7). With the condition of monotonicity we get that in any non-revealing
equilibrium we must have
x^L(l)  xmL and xmH  x^H(h):
Because if, for example, x^L(l) > xmL then candidate L could win with a higher
probability by moving towards xmL when !
V = l (see the proof of Theorem 4.8
for more details, the argument is analogous).
21
Then we are ready to formulate our main result on monotone non-revealing
equilibria. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 5.1 (Mon. Non-Rev. Equilibria: Strategies and Existence)
1. ((x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) 2 [xmL ; xmH ]4 is the strategy prole of a monotone
non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
x^L(l) = xmL and x^
H(h) = xmH
and
V  1
2
(1 +

 +maxfx^H(l)  xmL ; xmH   x^L(h)g
):
2. If ((x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) =2 [xmL ; xmH ]4 is the strategy prole of a
monotone non-revealing equilibrium then so is the prole where, for each i
and !V , x^i(!V ) is replaced by xmL if x^
i(!V ) < xmL and by x

mH
if xmH <
x^i(!V ).
From the result we immediately see that there always exists a monotone non-
revealing equilibrium with
x^L(l) = x^H(l) = xmL and x^
L(h) = x^H(h) = xmH ;
i.e., an equilibrium where the candidates converge on the median that is most
likely given only the voterssignal. This type of candidate behavior we refer to as
pandering. When V is not too high then the candidate not favored by the voters
signal (Candidate L when !V = h, Candidate H when !V = l) need not be close
to the median that is most likely given this signal. For example, the strategies
x^L(l) = x^L(h) = xmL and x^
H(l) = x^H(h) = xmH
are possible in (monotone) equilibrium if
V  1
2
(1 +

 +D
):
So when the accuracy of the voterssignal is below this cut-o¤value both pandering
and full polarization is possible. And of course a lot of other strategy proles which
involve some pandering and some polarization are also possible.
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6 Welfare
In this section we will do a welfare comparison of di¤erent strategy proles. A
strategy prole consists of a position for each candidate for each combination of
values of !V and !C . Obviously, only strategy proles where positions do not
depend on the value of !V are relevant for Case 1. We will compare the proles
with repect to the ex ante expected utility that each voter obtains. When comparing
the strategy proles we will assume that the belief of the voters is given by Bayesian
updating and that they vote based on expected utility. So in our comparison we
assume that voters behave as they would if the strategy prole was part of an
equilibrium. Eventually, we will use the welfare comparison of strategy proles
to do a welfare comparison of Case 1 and 2. More precisely, we will compare the
rened equilibria of the two cases for xed parameter values. Furthermore, we will
use the welfare comparisons of strategy proles to show that, within each case,
more voter information is welfare improving.
We will focus on the three main types of candidate behavior that we have
encountered in rened equilibria: Revelation, polarization, and pandering. Let us
briey recall what we mean by these three terms. Revelation means that, for both
values of the voterssignal !V , the strategy prole is given by
x^L(l; !V ) = x^H(l; !V ) = xmL and x^
L(h; !V ) = x^H(h; !V ) = xmH :
Polarization means that, for both values of !V ,
x^L(l; !V ) = x^L(h; !V ) = xmL and x^
H(l; !V ) = x^H(h; !V ) = xmH :
Finally, pandering means that, for both values of !C ,
x^L(!C ; l) = x^H(!C ; l) = xmL and x^
L(!C ; h) = x^H(!C ; h) = xmH :
The voting decisions of the voters, and thus the outcome of the election, depend
on the votersbeliefs about the state (we assume that they maximize expected
utility given their beliefs). Therefore, in order to calculate the ex ante expected
utility of each of the three strategy proles for each voter, we must specify the
beliefs of the voters. As mentioned above, we assume that voters are Bayesians.
This means that they form their belief based on the values of !V and !C if the
strategy prole is revealing, otherwise (i.e., for the pandering and polarization
proles) they form their belief based only on the value of !V . This is of course
identical to what the beliefs would be in equilibrium. Therefore, our comparison
of strategy proles makes it straightforward to do a comparison of equilibria.
With the above assumption on votersbeliefs, a strategy prole s denes an
outcome map os : (!C ; !V ; ) 7! (w; xw), where w 2 fL;Hg is the winning can-
didate and xw is the policy position of this candidate. Let Ui((j; xj)j!) denote
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the utility of voter i when candidate j with position xj is elected and the state
is !. Given a strategy prole s the utility of voter i in state ! as a function of
(!C ; !V ; ) can then be written Ui(os(!C ; !V ; )j!). So for given values of !C , !V ,
and  the expected utility for voter i of the strategy prole s isX
!=L;H
Pr(!j!C ; !V )Ui(os(!C ; !V ; )j!):
Thus voter is ex ante expected utility of the strategy prole s can be written
E(!C ;!V );[
X
!=L;H
Pr(!j!C ; !V )Ui(os(!C ; !V ; )j!)];
where the expectation is with respect to the ex ante distribution of (!C ; !V ) and
the distribution of . In more detail the ex ante expected utility is
X
!C=l;h
!V =l;h
Pr(!C ; !V )
Z 1
2
  1
2
[
X
!=L;H
Pr(!j!C ; !V )Ui(os(!C ; !V ; )j!)]d:
Note that the ex ante distribution of (!C ; !V ) is given by
Pr(l; l) = Pr(h; h) =
1
2
(CV + (1  C)(1  V ))
and
Pr(l; h) = Pr(h; l) =
1
2
(C(1  V ) + (1  C)V ):
First, we compare strategy proles with respect to policy only, i.e., we consider
only the policy part of the votersutility functions. We let di denote the distance
of voter i from the median voter, i.e.,
di = jxi (L)  xmL j = jxi (H)  xmH j:
The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 6.1 (Welfare Comparison: Policy Utility) With respect to ex ante
expected policy utility (and for xed parameter values), the following ranking of
strategy proles holds for all voters:
Revelation  Pandering  Polarization.
For voters i with di < D the ranking is strict, for voters with di  D the three
strategy proles all give the same ex ante expected policy utility.
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Second, we compare strategy proles with respect to ex ante expected total
utility. The -term in the utility of voting for candidate L is included in the total
utility. Note that the result (and all previous results) does not depend on whether
the -term is added to the utility of voting for candidate L, subtracted from the
utility of voting for candidate H, or something in between. More precisely, all of
our analysis would remain unchanged if we had instead let each voter is utilities
of voting for candidate L and H be
Ui((L; x
L)j!) =

ui(x
LjL) +  +  if ! = L
ui(x
LjH) +  if ! = H

and
Ui((H; x
H)j!) =

ui(x
H jL)  (1  ) if ! = L
ui(x
H jH) +    (1  ) if ! = H

;
where  2 [0; 1). The proof of the theorem below is in Appendix A.
Theorem 6.2 (Welfare Comparison: Total Utility) With respect to ex ante
expected total utility (and for xed parameter values), the following ranking of
strategy proles holds for all voters:
Revelation  Pandering  Polarization.
From the results above we see that, with respect to both policy and total utility,
there is a clear Pareto ranking of the three types of candidate behavior. Revelation
dominates pandering which dominates polarization. This ranking is quite intuitive.
In the revelation prole voters learn all available information and both candidates
are positioned at the most likely median (note that, since C > V , the most
likely median given !C is also the most likely median given both !C and !V ).
When candidates pander voters do not learn the value of !C and the candidates
converge on the most likely median given only the value of !V . Therefore it is not
surprising that, from an ex ante perspective where all combinations of (!C ; !V )
are considered, all voters are better o¤with revelation than with pandering. (Note
that some voters may of course prefer pandering over revelation for specic values
of !C and !V . For example, voters with xi (L); x

i (H) > x

mH
will obviously get a
higher policy utility from pandering than from revelation when (!C ; !V ) = (l; h)).
When candidates are polarized voters have the same information (the value of
their own signal) as when they are pandering. But the candidatespositions do
not reect this information, each candidate always announces the same position.
This is bad for the voters and therefore polarization is dominated by pandering.
We can use the results above to do a welfare comparison of Case 1 and 2. Is
it optimal for the voters that their information is not available to the candidates
25
when they take positions or is it the other way around? We do this welfare com-
parison the following way. First of all we restrict attention to rened equilibria
where all positions are between the two medians. Furthermore, we disregard the
"asymmetric" equilibria of Case 2 where the distance between x^L(h) and xmH is
di¤erent from the distance between x^H(l) and xmL
2. Then, with these restrictions,
for each case and each set of parameter values select the equilibrium that is opti-
mal with respect to the ex ante expected total utility of each voter. The outcome
of this selection is presented in the following table.
V  R V < R
Case 1 Revelation Polarization
Case 2 Pandering Pandering
(Note that equilibria in Case 2 that involve some polarization and some pandering
are, like polarization, dominated by pandering. The proof of this claim is similar
to the proof that pandering dominates polarization). We then compare the two
cases by comparing the optimal equilibria for xed parameter values. We see that
if voters are su¢ ciently well informed about the state of the world (V  R) then
Case 1 is optimal. But if they are not then Case 2 is optimal. Note that this
result remains the same if we compare the cases with respect to ex ante expected
policy utility (except for the fact that with respect to policy utility some voters
are indi¤erent between the two cases so we have a weak rather than strong Pareto
ranking). Also note that if we instead of comparing optimal equilibria say that Case
1 is better than Case 2 if any equilibrium of Case 1 dominates any equilibrium of
Case 2 (and vice versa) then we get a weaker but similar result. Case 1 dominates
Case 2 when only revelation is a rened equilibrium of Case 1, i.e., when V > N .
Case 2 dominates Case 1 when only polarization is a rened equilibrium of Case 1,
i.e., when V < R. When both revelation and polarization are rened equilibria
of Case 1, i.e., when R  V  N , a comparison is not possible.
Finally, we show that, in each of the two cases, voters are better o¤with respect
to total utility if they have more accurate information, i.e., if V is higher. More
precisely we will show that if we compare the optimal equilibrium for two di¤erent
values of V (while holding all other parameters xed) then the equilibrium of
2These equilibria could be included in the welfare comparison of the two cases in the fol-
lowing natural way. For each asymmetric rened equilibrium consider a lottery where there is
probability 12 of ending up in this equilibrium and probability
1
2 of ending up in its "mirror
image" (i.e., the equilibrium where the distance between the position of Candidate L (H) and
xmH (x

mL) when !
V = h (l) is equal to the distance between the position of Candidate H (L)
and xmL (x

mH ) when !
V = l (h) in the original equilibrium). Calculate each voters expected
utility of this lottery. Finally, compare with symmetric equilibria and similar lotteries between
other asymmetric equilibria. With this way of including asymmetric equilibria in the welfare
comparison all results remain the same.
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the situation where voters are better informed will Pareto dominate the other
equilibrium (note that we use the same restrictions on equilibria as above). To see
this, rst note that for a xed (symmetric) strategy prole the ex ante expected
total utility of each voter is increasing in V . This is quite obvious and can easily be
checked. With this observation the conclusion easily follows from the table above.
In Case 2 pandering is always the optimal equilibrium and thus the conclusion
is trivial. In Case 1 the optimal equilibrium is polarization for low values of V
(below R) and revelation for high values of 
V (above R). And since revelation
dominates polarization we are done. Note that if we use policy utility instead
of total utility we get the same result. Also note that, in both cases and with
respect to both policy and total utility, we can strengthen the result above so that
we do not only consider the optimal equilibrium for each set of parameter values.
Let V1 > 
V
2 (and, of course, 
C > V1 ). In Case 1 it is easy to see that each
equilibrium of the V1 -situation Pareto dominates all equilibria of the 
V
2 -situation.
This is not true in Case 2, but we can still strengthen our rst result. Let SVi ,
i = 1; 2, be the set of all equilibrium strategy proles of the Vi -situation. Then it
is easily seen that all proles in SV2 n SV1 are Pareto dominated by each prole in
SV1 . So all strategy proles that are part of a equilibrium in the 
V
2 -situation but
not in the V1 -situation are Pareto dominated by each equilibrium strategy in the
V1 -situation.
7 Discussion
We have analyzed a model of electoral competition under uncertainty where can-
didates are better informed than voters. Candidates were assumed to be o¢ ce
motivated and to di¤er only in state-dependent quality. The o¢ ce-motivation
creates an electoral pressure for the candidates to converge on the median they
believe to be most likely and thus reveal their information. However, because of
the di¤erence in quality there is always one candidate who also has an incentive
to choose a policy position such that voters cannot infer the information of the
candidates. This is the central strategic aspect of the model.
If votersinformation is unknown to the candidates when they take positions
then, in rened equilibrium, candidates will reveal their information by converging
on the most likely median if the voters information is su¢ ciently accurate. If
the information of the voters is not su¢ ciently accurate then each candidate will
announce the median position of the state in which he has a quality advantage.
Thus the candidates will be polarized and the voters are not able to infer the
candidatesinformation.
We also considered the situation where candidates know voters information
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when they take positions. In that case a rened equilibrium where the candidates
positions reveal their information does not exist. Thus voters always have to rely
solely on their own information when deciding who to vote for. Candidates will
either pander by converging on the median of the state that is most likely given
only the voterssignal or be polarized.
With respect to welfare, we saw that, ex ante, it is optimal for all voters
that candidates reveal their information by converging on the most likely median.
Furthermore, pandering is better than polarization. Therefore, when voters are
well informed it is better for them that candidates do not know their information
when they take positions. But when voters are poorly informed then it is the
other way around, they are all better o¤ if candidates know which signal they
have recieved.
A number of interesting insights about the functioning of representative democ-
racy when candidates are better informed than voters follow from our analysis.
First, our results show that policy motivated candidates are not necessary for elec-
toral competition to be ine¢ cient with respect to making all information available
to the electorate. As we have seen, di¤erences in state-dependent quality can make
fully o¢ ce motivated candidates play non-revealing strategies. However, if voters
are reasonably well informed and candidates are not certain about votersinfor-
mation when they take positions then electoral competition is e¢ cient. So our
results clearly point to the importance of an informed electorate and conditions
that make candidates take positions at a point in time where they are not certain
about what information voters will have on election day.
It is also interesting to note that if the quality di¤erence between the candi-
dates (measured by the parameter ) increases then it takes more accurate voter
information to get existence of a revealing rened equilibrium. So an election with
two candidates who have substantially di¤erent skills (high ) is more likely to lead
to a bad policy choice than an election with two reasonably similar candidates (low
).
Finally note that the optimal equilibrium of the case where candidates know
votersinformation when they take positions is always pandering. Therefore it is
somewhat counterintutive that this case is optimal when the electorate is not too
well informed. But this is true, of course, because the optimal rened equilibrium
outcome of the other case (votersinformation not known to candidates) is better
than pandering when voters are well informed and worse when they are poorly
informed. So in this respect we have the counterintuitive result that pandering is
optimal if and only if the electorate not well informed.
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9 Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 4.5.
First we show that V  R ) existence.
Consider the strategies
(x^L(l); x^L(h)) = (x^H(l); x^H(h)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
Furthermore, consider a belief function ^L that is consistent with Bayes rule when
xL = xH = xmL or x
L = xH = xmH , unprejudiced, and satises
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) = 1; L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 0;
and
^L(x

mH
; xmL ; l) = L(x

mH
; xmL ; h) =
1
2
:
We claim that these strategies and such a belief function constitutes an equilibrium
when V  R. To prove this we have to check the optimality of each candidates
strategy. First consider the strategies when !C = l. Since the belief function
is unprejudiced it follows easily that neither candidate can gain by deviating to
some x 6= xmH (such a deviation will not change the votersbelief). Thus we just
have to check that neither candidate can protably deviate to xmH . In equilibrium
Candidate L wins with probability
Pr(!V = lj!C = l) Pr[ > (1  2 
CV
CV + (1  C)(1  V ))]
+ Pr(!V = hj!C = l) Pr[ > (1  2 
C(1  V )
C(1  V ) + (1  C)V )];
which is equal to
1
2
+ (2C   1):
Thus Candidate H wins with probability
1
2
  (2C   1):
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If Candidate L deviates to xmH then his probability of winning is
1
2
so this deviation
is never protable for him. If Candidate H deviates to xmH then his probability
of winning is
Pr(!V = lj!C = l) Pr[ <  (D + )] + Pr(!V = hj!C = l) Pr[ <  +D];
which is equal to
1
2
+ (1  2(CV + (1  C)(1  V )))( +D):
So the deviation is not protable if (and only if)
1
2
+ (1  2(CV + (1  C)(1  V )))( +D)  1
2
  (2C   1):
This inequality is equivalent to
V  R:
By symmetry it follows that if neither candidate has a protable deviation when
!C = l then this is also the case when !C = h. Thus the equilibrium conditions
are satised if V  R.
Finally we show that existence ) V  R.
Suppose there exists an unprejudiced revealing equilibrium. We know from
Theorem 4.4 that the candidate strategies must be
(x^L(l); x^L(h)) = (x^H(l); x^H(h)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
Two necessary conditions for equilibrium are that Candidate H cannot gain by
deviating to xmH when !
C = l and that Candidate L cannot gain by deviating to
xmL when !
C = h. Let ^L be the equilibrium belief function and dene
^lL = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) and ^
h
L = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h):
Then the necessary conditions can be written
Pr(!V = lj!C = l)( 1
2
  ^lL( +D) + (1  ^lL)( +D))
+Pr(!V = hj!C = l)( 1
2
  ^hL( +D) + (1  ^hL)( +D)) 
1
2
  (2C   1)
and
Pr(!V = hj!C = h)( 1
2
  (1  ^hL)( +D) + ^hL( +D))
+Pr(!V = lj!C = h)( 1
2
  (1  ^lL)( +D) + ^lL( +D)) 
1
2
  (2C   1):
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Thus it su¢ ces to show that if both the two inequalities above are satised then
we have V  R. By adding the two inequalities and a bit of algebra we get
(^lL   ^hL)(2(CV + (1  C)(1  V ))  1)( +D)  (2C   1):
Thus we see that ^lL > ^
h
L and then it follows that
(2(CV + (1  C)(1  V ))  1)( +D)  (2
C   1)
(^lL   ^hL)
 (2C   1):
Rearranging this inequality we get V  R. 2
Proof of observation on page 14.
Let (x^L; x^H), ^L be a non-revealing equilibrium with (x^
L; x^H) =2 [xmL ; xmH ]2.
Dene the strategy prole (~xL; ~xH) 2 [xmL ; xmH ]2 by
~xi =
8<:
xmL if x^
i < xmL
x^i if xmL  x^i  xmH
xmH if x

mH
< x^i
9=; for i = L;H.
Dene ~L by
~L(~x
L; ~xH ; !V ) = ^L(x^
L; x^H ; !V );
~L(~x
L; x; !V ) = ^L(x^
L; x; !V ) for all x 6= ~xH ; !V 2 fl; hg;
~L(x; ~x
H ; !V ) = ^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) for all x 6= ~xL; !V 2 fl; hg:
We claim that (~xL; ~xH), ~L is a non-revealing equilibrium. Obviously, Bayes rule is
satised on the equilibrium path. To check that neither candidate has a protable
deviation rst dene
Di = dist(x^
i; [xmL ; x

mH
]); i = L;H:
Let P^Eqi denote Candidate is equilibrium probability of winning in the original
equilibrium. It is straightforward to check that Candidate is probability of win-
ning in the new situation is
P^Eqi + (Di  Dj); j 6= i:
Let P^i(x) denote Candidate is probability of winning when deviating to x 6=
x^i in the original equilibrium. It is straightforward to check that Candidate is
probability of winning by deviating to x in the new situation is
P^i(x) Dj; j 6= i:
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So a deviation by i to x 6= x^i is not protable if
P^i(x)  P^Eqi +Di:
This is obviously true since (x^L; x^H), ^L is an equilibrium. If ~x
i 6= x^i we also
have to consider deviations to x^i. After such a deviation the belief of the voters
is exactly as when they observe (~xL; ~xH), i.e., it is given by Bayesian updating
based on the value of !V . And since the deviating candidate is moving from xmL
to x^i < xmL or from x

mH
to x^i > xmH it follows that such a deviation cannot be
protable. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.6.
1. Consider a strategy prole (x^L; x^H) and a belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) = V and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  V ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= x^L; !V = l; h:
This belief function satises Bayes rule on the equilibrium path and no other belief
function makes it less protable for either candidate to deviate. Thus it su¢ ces
to show that (x^L; x^H), ^L is an equilibrium if and only if the condition on 
V
from the theorem is satised. It is easy to see that no candidate can protably
deviate if and only if Candidate H cannot protably deviate to xmL when !
C = l
and Candidate L cannot protably deviate to xmH when !
C = h. (If x^H = xmL
(x^L = xmH ) we just have to check that Candidate H (L) cannot protably deviate
to a position very close to xmL (x

mH
).)
When !C = l Candidate Hs equilibrium probability of winning is
1
2
  (2C   1)(2V   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
By deviating to xmL Candidate H wins with probability
1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL)):
(If x^H = xmL then he can win with a probability that is arbitrarily close to this
number by deviating to a position x that is su¢ ciently close to xmL). Thus the
deviation is not protable if and only if
1
2
  (2C   1)(2V   1)2( + (x^H   x^L))  1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL));
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which is equivalent to
V  1
2
(1 +
s
   (x^L   xmL)
( + (x^H   x^L))(2C   1)):
Analogously we get that Candidate L does not have a protable deviation if
V  1
2
(1 +
s
   (xmH   x^H)
( + (x^H   x^L))(2C   1)):
Thus we have an equilibrium if and only if V is below the minimum of the two cut-
o¤ values above. The minimum is precisely the cut-o¤ value from the statement.
2. First note that if (x^L; x^H) is an equilibrium strategy prole and x^L  x^H 6= 
then each candidate will, for one value of !C , win with a probability strictly lower
than 1
2
. Also note that at least one of the candidates has a deviation that will give
him a win with probability 1
2
no matter what the value of !C is and no matter
what voters believe if they observe this deviation: If x^L  xmL >  then candidate
H can deviate to x^L , if xmH   x^H >  then candidate L can deviate to x^H +.
Thus (x^L; x^H) with x^L   x^H 6=  cannot be an equilibrium strategy prole.
Then consider (x^L; x^H) with x^L   x^H =  and a voter belief function ^L satis-
fying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) = V and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  V ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^L; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^L; !V = l; h:
In this situation each candidate wins with probability 1
2
for each value of !C . If a
candidate deviates then he wins with a probability that is strictly smaller than 1
2
.
Therefore we have an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
1. The necessity of rst condition follows from monotonicity (see the remarks
above the theorem). And then the necessity of the second condition follows from
part 1: of the result in Appendix B. To show that the conditions are su¢ cient we
have to show that ((xmL ; x^
L(h)); (x^H(l); xmH )) can be supported as an equilibrium
by a monotone belief function. Let ^L be a monotone belief function satisfying
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the following conditions (none of these conditions violate monotonicity).
^L(x

mL
; x^H(l); l) = V and ^L(x^
L(h); xmH ; h) = 1  V ;
^L(x

mL
; x; l) = 1 for all x < x^H(l);
^L(x

mL
; x; l) = V for all x > x^H(l);
^L(x^
L(h); x; h) = 1  V for all x 6= xmH ;
^L(x; x

mH
; h) = 1  V for all x < x^L;
^L(x; x

mH
; h) = 0 for all x > x^L;
^L(x; x^
H(l); l) = V for all x 6= xmL :
It is easy to see that if Candidate H cannot protably deviate to xmL when !
V = l
(if x^H(l) 6= xmL) and Candidate L cannot protably deviate to xmH when !V = h
(if x^H(h) 6= xmH ) then neither candidate has any protable deviations. Straight-
forward calculations show that neither of these two deviations are protable if V
is below the upper bound stated in the theorem.
2. Suppose ((x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) =2 [xmL ; xmH ]4 is the strategy prole
of a monotone non-revealing equilibrium. Consider the prole where, for each i
and !V , x^i(!V ) is replaced by xmL if x^
i(!V ) < xmL and by x

mH
if xmH < x^
i(!V ).
Denote this prole ((~xL(l); ~xL(h)); (~xH(l); ~xH(h))). Because of monotonicity we
must have ~xL(l) = xmL and ~x
H(h) = xmH . Let ~L be a monotone belief function
satisfying the same conditions as ^L in the proof of the rst statement (with x^
L(h)
and x^H(l) replaced by ~xL(h) and ~xH(l)). We then claim that if Candidate i can
protably deviate from ~xi(!V ) when the voters belief is given by ~L then the
same deviation would also be protable in the original equilibrium, which is a
contradiction. Candidate H has a protable deviation from ~xH(!V ) when the
votersbelief is given by ~L if and only if it is protable for him to deviate to x

mL
when !V = l. Suppose that this is the case. Using notation similar to that in the
proof of the observation on page 14, Candidate Hs probability of winning from
announcing ~xH(l) when !V = l is
P^EqH (l) + (DH  DL):
Candidate Hs probaility of winning after deviating to xmL is at most
P^H(x

mL
; l) DL:
Thus we see that if the deviation is protable then we must have
P^H(x

mL
; l) > P^EqH (l);
which means that in the original equilibrium a deviation by Candidate H to xmL is
protable, which is a contradiction. Analogously we also get a contradiction if we
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assume that Candidate L can protably deviate from ~xL(h) to xmH when !
V = h.
Thus ((~xL(l); ~xL(h)); (~xH(l); ~xH(h))), ~L is a monotone non-revealing equilibrium.
2
Proof of Theorem 6.1.
First we show that the ex ante expected policy utility of the median voter
satises the ranking in the theorem. Then we show that if the ranking holds for
the median voter then it holds for all voters.
The median voters ex ante expected policy utility from the revelation strategy
prole is:
Pr(!C = l; !V = l)(Pr(Ljl; l)0 + Pr(Hjl; l)( D))
+Pr(!C = h; !V = h)(Pr(Hjh; h)0 + Pr(Ljh; h)( D))
+Pr(!C = l; !V = h)(Pr(Ljl; h)0 + Pr(Hjl; h)( D))
+Pr(!C = h; !V = l)(Pr(Hjh; l)0 + Pr(Ljh; l)( D))
= Pr(!C = !V )(Pr(Ljl; l)0 + Pr(Hjl; l)( D))
+Pr(!C 6= !V )(Pr(Ljl; h)0 + Pr(Hjl; h)( D))
= (CV + (1  C)(1  V ))( (1  
C)(1  V )
CV + (1  C)(1  V )( D))
+(C(1  V ) + (1  C)V )( 
V (1  C)
C(1  V ) + (1  C)V ( D))
=  (1  C)D:
The median voters ex ante expected policy utility from the pandering prole
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is
Pr(!C = l; !V = l)(Pr(Ljl; l)0 + Pr(Hjl; l)( D))
+Pr(!C = h; !V = h)(Pr(Hjh; h)0 + Pr(Ljh; h)( D))
+Pr(!C = l; !V = h)(Pr(Ljl; h)( D) + Pr(Hjl; h)0)
+Pr(!C = h; !V = l)(Pr(Hjh; l)( D) + Pr(Ljh; l)0)
= Pr(!C = !V )(Pr(Ljl; l)0 + Pr(Hjl; l)( D)
+Pr(!C 6= !V )(Pr(Ljl; h)( D) + Pr(Hjl; h)0)
= (CV + (1  C)(1  V ))( (1  
C)(1  V )
CV + (1  C)(1  V )( D))
+(C(1  V ) + (1  C)V )( 
C(1  V )
C(1  V ) + (1  C)V ( D))
=  (1  V )D;
which is lower than the utility from the revelation prole since C > V .
Let pol denote the -value for which the median voter switches his vote when
the candidates are polarized and !V = l (the -value for which the median voter
switches his vote when !V = h is then  pol). The ex ante expected policy utility
from the polarization prole can then be written
Pr(!C = l; !V = l)(Pr( < pol) Pr(Ljl; l)( D) + Pr( > pol) Pr(Hjl; l)( D))
+Pr(!C = h; !V = h)(Pr( >  pol) Pr(Hjh; h)( D) + Pr( <  pol) Pr(Ljh; h)( D))
+Pr(!C = l; !V = h)(Pr( <  pol) Pr(Ljl; h)( D) + Pr( >  pol) Pr(Hjl; h)( D))
+Pr(!C = h; !V = l)(Pr( > pol) Pr(Hjh; l)( D) + Pr( < pol) Pr(Ljh; l)( D))
= Pr(!C = !V )(Pr( < pol) Pr(Ljl; l)( D) + Pr( > pol) Pr(Hjl; l)( D))
+Pr(!C 6= !V )(Pr( > pol) Pr(Hjh; l)( D) + Pr( < pol) Pr(Ljh; l)( D))
= CV Pr( < pol)( D) + (1  C)(1  V ) Pr( > pol)( D)
+C(1  V ) Pr( > pol)( D) + V (1  C) Pr( < pol)( D):
Since pol = (1  2V )(D + ) we have
Pr( > pol) = (
1
2
+ (2V   1)(D + ))
=
1
2
+ (2V   1)(D + ):
Thus the ex ante expected utility becomes
D((2V   1)2(D + )   1
2
):
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Since D +  < 1
2
, this number is strictly smaller than
D((2V   1)21
2
  1
2
) =  2V (1  V )D;
which is strictly smaller than  (1   V )D. Thus the ranking of proles in the
theorem is satised for the median voter.
Then consider a voter with di = jxi (L)  xmL j = jxi (H)  xmH j 2 (0; D). For
such a voter the ex ante expected policy utility of the three proles are
 (1  C)D   diC ;
 (1  V )D   diV ;
and
D((2V   1)2(D + )   1
2
)  di((2V   1)2(D + ) + 1
2
):
It is then straightforward to check that the ranking of the theorem is satised for
all voters with di 2 (0; D).
For voters with di  D the ex ante policy utility of all three equilibria are equal
to  di. So for such voters all equilibria are equally good with respect to policy. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
By Theorem 6.1 it su¢ ces to show that the ranking from the theorem holds
with respect to ex ante expected quality utility ("the  and  terms"). With respect
to quality all voters have identical preferences, so we do not need to distinguish
between di¤erent voters.
We rst show that revelation gives voters a strictly higher ex ante expected
quality utility than pandering. In both of these strategy proles there is always
policy convergence. Thus the voting decision of each voter is based solely on qual-
ity utility. When candidates reveal their information then, for each combination
of values of !C , !V , and , voters take the optimal decision given all available
information in the game. When candidates are pandering voters cannot infer the
value of !C and thus, for each combination of values of !C and !V , there are values
of  such that voters do not make the optimal choice (i.e., the optimal choice had
kney known both !C and !V ). Therefore revelation must give a higher ex ante
expected quality utility.
Finally, we show that pandering dominates polarization with respect to quality
utility. Since there is always policy convergence in the pandering prole it follows
that, for each combination of values of !C , !V , and , voters take the optimal
decision with respect to quality utility under the constraint that they do not know
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!C . In the polarization prole there is always policy divergence and therefore,
for each combination of values of !C and !V , there are values of  such that the
median voter (who decides the outcome of the election) does not make the optimal
choice with respect to quality utility under the constraint that he does not know
!C . Therefore pandering dominates polarization with respect to ex ante expected
quality utility. 2
10 Appendix B
Theorem 10.1 (Non-Rev. Equil. in Case 2: Strategies and Existence)
Let ((x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) 2 [xmL ; xmH ]4.
1. If maxfx^L(l)   xmL ; xmH   x^H(h)g <  then (x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h)))
is the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
V  1
2
(1 + minf    (x^
L(l)  xmL)
 + (x^H(l)  x^L(l)) ;
   (xmH   x^H(h))
 + (x^H(h)  x^L(h))g):
2. If x^L(l)  xmL  , xmH   x^H(h) <  then (x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) is
the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
x^L(l)  x^H(l) = 
and
V  1
2
(1 +
   (xmH   x^H(h))
 + (x^H(h)  x^L(h))):
3. If x^L(l)  xmL < , xmH   x^H(h)   then (x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) is
the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
x^L(h)  x^H(h) = 
and
V  1
2
(1 +
   (x^L(l)  xmL)
 + (x^H(l)  x^L(l))):
4. If minfx^L(l) xmL ; xmH   x^H(h)g   then (x^L(l); x^L(h)); (x^H(l); x^H(h))) is
the strategy prole of a non-revealing equilibrium if and only if
x^L(l)  x^H(l) = x^L(h)  x^H(h) = :
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Proof.
1. Consider a belief function ^L satifying the following conditions:
^L(x^
L(l); x^H(l); l) = V and ^L(x^
L(h); x^H(h); h) = 1  V ;
^L(x^
L(h); x; h) = 1 for all x 6= x^H(h);
^L(x^
L(l); x; l) = 1 for all x 6= x^H(l);
^L(x; x^
H(h); h) = 0 for all x 6= x^L(h);
^L(x; x^
H(l); l) = 0 for all x 6= x^L(l):
This belief function supports the strategy prole as an equilibrium if and only if
Candidate L cannot protably deviate to xmH when !
V = h and Candidate H
cannot protably deviate to xmL when !
V = l. These conditions are equivalent
to the condition on V stated in the theorem. Finally, if the condition from the
theorem is not satised then it is easy to see that, no matter how we dene out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, one of the deviations considered above will be protable.
2. Use the arguments from 1. when !V = h and the arguments from 4. when
!V = l.
3. Use the arguments from 1. when !V = l and the arguments from 4. when
!V = h.
4. Consider a belief function ^L satifying the following conditions:
^L(x^
L(l); x^H(l); l) = V and ^L(x^
L(h); x^H(h); h) = 1  V ;
^L(x^
L(!V ); x; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^H(!V ); !V = l; h;
^L(x^
L(!V ); x; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^H(!V ); !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H(!V ); !V ) = 0 for all x < x^L(!V ); !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H(!V ); !V ) = 1 for all x > x^L(!V ); !V = l; h:
Such a belief function supports the strategy prole if the conditions stated in the
theorem are satised.
If x^L(l) x^H(l) <  (x^L(h) x^H(h) < ) then consider a deviation by Candidate
H (L) to x^L(l)    (x^H(h) + ) when !V = l (!V = h). After this deviation he
wins with probability 1
2
no matter what the out-of-equilibrium belief of the voters
is. Thus it is a protable deviation.
If x^L(l) x^H(l) >  (x^L(h) x^H(h) > ) then consider a deviation by Candidate
L (H) to x^H(l) +  (x^L(h)   ) when !V = l (!V = h). After this deviation he
wins with probability 1
2
no matter what the out-of-equilibrium belief of the voters
is. Thus it is a protable deviation.2
40
